Nuclear weapons have long been an icon of absolute power and the menace of annihilation to human existence. The nuclear order has been positioned on a set of treaties and norms to curb the proliferation of these weapons since the end of the cold war. But today the world is much different compared with the bipolar confrontation between the U.S and Soviet Union. With the spread of power between old and new states, the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is entering a new and more complicated stage.
The Pillars of Non-Proliferation.
The most important element of the international non-proliferation regime is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is based on three pillars, namely, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states; the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy; and the engagement of the known states with nuclear weapons to engage in disarmament. This framework was further strengthened over time through export control regimes, verification mechanisms through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other regional treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones.
The Cold War created conditions whereby the logic of deterrence and the close control of technology by the super powers restricted the presence of a nuclear armed state. Although India, Pakistan and Israel developed off-peak capabilities that were not covered by the NPT, the general norm of proliferation remained quite robust. However, the system had been developed in a world dominated by two super powers. The modern world is far more disillusioned.
Multi-polarity and Pressures.
Multi-polarity defines the sharing of power between a varieties of powerful states in lieu of the duopoly. In the nuclear sphere, this would imply an increasing number of states having high-tech capabilities, conflicting regional security social problems and de-centralized implementation. The ascendancy of China, India and other emerging powers; the breakdown of arms-control treaties between the U.S. and Russia; and the Korean peninsula and Middle East tensions are all complicating the ancient construct.
As a case in point, the cancelation of the involvement in major arms-control agreements by Russia, puts a strain on the transparency and verification systems previously used to provide a sense of security in other states. Modernizing its arsenal, China is not the signatory of many bilateral agreements that Washington and Moscow shared. In the meantime, North Korea has testily disowned the NPT, and the Iranian nuclear arsenal is a hot potato despite negotiated constraints. The incentive to hedge or latent capabilities in such an environment can go up.
Dynamic Regionalism and Security Harms.
Multi-polarity is different in different regions. In South Asia, the nuclear weapons have established themselves as the primary focus of the national security policies due to the historical rivalry between India and Pakistan. The progress of both sides in delivery mechanisms or doctrines like India in its interest in ballistic missile defense or the Pakistan in their tactical nuclear weapons have been met with counter measures which have complicated restraint efforts.
The Middle East has been feeling threatened by the nuclear weapons development of Iran and this has led to debates on a regional arms race, with Saudi Arabia indicating that it could end up comparable to Tehran. In East Asia, it is a question of the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence in the face of increasing arsenal of North Korea and rising China. Without effective multilateral institutions and the cooperation of great powers, such regional security dilemmas are more difficult to control.
The Change in Technology and the Waning of Norms.
The other problem of multipolar world is that there is a fast diffusion of technology. Further developments in enrichment, reprocessing as well as dual-use materials make states easier to reach nuclear weapons breakeven without necessarily breaching treaties. Cyber operations, commercial satellite imagery and additive manufacturing may enhance verification as well as offer new paths towards covert development.
Confidence is also weakened by the weakening of arms-control norms. The demise of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and uncertainty concerning the future of New START makes major power predictability less certain. In the absence of plausible disarmament movement by the nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear signatories of the NPT are doubtful of the trade-off at the core of the treaty. This was demonstrated during the most recent NPT Review Conference in the year 2022 which ended without agreement.
Empowering the Regime of a Disaggregated Landscape.
There is a need to adapt to the current framework instead of to ignore nuclear non-proliferation in a multipolar world. Several steps stand out:
Reinvigorate great-power dialogue. The U.S., Russia and China share an interest in ensuring that there is no uncontrolled proliferation even in the face of rivalry. It is essential to broaden arms-control discussions to encompass new actors, and new technologies.
Improve the security measures in the region. Security dilemmas can be reduced by confidence-building efforts, crisis hotlines, as well as arms-control agreements on a regional scale. Examples are the Treaty of Tlatelolco of Latin America and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
Enhance verification and transparency. The capabilities of the IAEA can be invested in, the use of open-source monitoring can be embraced and multilateral fuel banks can be developed, which will decrease the motivation of states to advance indigenous sensitive technologies.
Restate the pledge of disarmament. States with nuclear weapons have to exhibit Article VI improvement with regard to NPT. Even such minor measures as the extension of New START, adoption of no-first-use policies, or making the stockpiles more transparent will enhance the credibility of the regime.
Address non-state actors. In a world where there is transnational threats, fissile and nuclear security is as significant as the deterrence of state proliferation. Conferences such as the Nuclear Security Summits must be reinforced and made permanent.
The Role of Emerging Norms
Other than treaties, norms determine state actions. The humanitarian program and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are an expression of increasing impatience by non-nuclear states at the snail-like pace of disarmament. Although the TPNW has not been accepted by nuclear powers, its normative effect may have a stigmatizing effect on nuclear weapons and shape popular views. It is the role of norm entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, middle powers, and international organizations to ensure that non-proliferation remains in the agenda.
Equally, the emergence of new norms regarding responsible nuclear conduct, including not victimizing cyberattacks on nuclear command-and-control or keeping crisis communication lines open, will help reduce escalation risks in a multipolar environment. It is perhaps more possible to develop these informal understandings than it is the sweeping new treaties.
Finding a balance between Deterrence and Restraint.
Among the nuclear age paradoxes is that weapons which are meant to prevent war are dangerous in the same breath. The possibility of miscalculating and accidental escalation may be increased in a multipolar world where more actors with different doctrines are in contact. The delicate balancing-act is thus, to maintain credible deterrence and yet promote arms control.
Other observers suggest shifting to more postures of minimum deterrence and de-altering forces to stretch the time taken in making decisions. Others promote multilateral regimes of transparency in missile defense, hypersonic weapons and space assets all of which have an influence on nuclear stability. The point is that no individual state is able to deliver its security on its own; the nuclear order is a common good.
Conclusion
The concept of nuclear non-proliferation has never been complete, but with the emergence of a multipolar world, the stakes are increased. The previous bilateral agreements and Cold War assumptions are not enough. But the fundamental reasoning of restraint prevails: unrestrained proliferation would turn the world into a much safer place to all, including even the most influential states.
This new reality requires new leadership, innovative diplomacy and a desire to revise norms and institutions to fit the twenty-first century. Provided that the NPT and associated mechanisms are able to evolve, they are the most promising way of avoiding the cascade of new nuclear powers. Should they slip, a world of increased insecurity may be plunged, with fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands, and less control.
In summary, it is not only the technical problem of nuclear non-proliferation in the multipolar world that is very problematic but also highly political. It will challenge the possibility of the international community to work together on one of the most existential matters of our time, despite power fragmentation and intensified rivalries.
